Introduction
Few external variables are as closely or widely watched as the current account balance.
Rightly or wrongly, it has been used as a barometer for a wide range of economic conditions-from the state of the business cycle to the sustainability of external financing. In recent years, attention to current account imbalances has taken on a global dimension, reflecting concern over "global imbalances." At the center is a large (albeit moderating) current account deficit in the United States, reflecting a shortfall of domestic saving relative to investment on the order of five to six percent of GDP. As a counterpart, large and/or growing current account surpluses have been recorded in Japan, [Canada,] China and other emerging Asia, but less so in Europe (excluding Russia). Whether such a global constellation of widening external imbalances can be sustained and for how long constitutes a key macroeconomic risk facing the world economy.
2 Namely, the possibility of a hard landing in the U.S. dollar-the international currency of choice-has raised concerns in many parts of the world over the potential fallout from a disorderly global rebalancing.
A notable countervailing argument to such concerns was perhaps most notably voiced by former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan. Turning matters around, he has argued that the unprecedented size of the U.S. deficit was itself a testimony to the increasingly efficient functioning of international capital markets and its ability to mobilize such a large share of net saving from the rest of the world to the United States. Specifically, he noted the following stylized fact regarding global trade and capital flows: This paper reexamines the global distribution of current accounts viewed from a longer term perspective. Using a panel of over one hundred countries that comprise over 95 percent of world output, the analysis establishes a set of "stylized facts" regarding the individual and collective behavior of current accounts over the past four decades. In particular, we examine the dispersion properties of external imbalances and interpret these empirical regularities in the context of increasing openness in trade and financial flows-often referred to as "globalization." While an emergent literature on financial globalization has documented that gross financial flows (including international reserve accumulation) has increased dramatically in recent years, what does this imply (if anything) for net flows? 3 More specifically, the central issues that the paper addresses include the following:
Uptrends in the ratios of external liabilities or assets to trade, and therefore to GDP, can be shown to have been associated with a widening dispersion in countries' ratios of trade and current account balances to GDP. A measure of that dispersion, the sum of the absolute values of the current account balances ...has been rising as a ratio to GDP
• Is the universe of current accounts expanding or narrowing? And, at what rate? What component of the U.S. external deficit specifically (and global imbalances broadly)
can be attributed to the underlying changes in global dispersion?
• What does changing global dispersion imply for current account persistence? What are the sources-trade or income?
• What economic factors help explain underlying trends in the dispersion of external imbalances?
Besides risk and policy implications, the question of rising dispersion has a direct bearing on the celebrated Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Their basic finding that savings are closely correlated with investments across countries has remained more or less intact, despite several prominent exceptions (e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi for Europe). Our query on rising dispersion would help to answer whether the background for the Feldstein-Horioka findings remains relevant. If there is no trend change in the dispersion of current accounts, FeldsteinHorioka correlations should continue to be confirmed in the data with statistical significance as strong as the original results. If instead a rising trend is identified in the dispersion of current accounts, it would suggest that these findings would likely weaken over time, though not necessarily becoming extinct.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines whether the global constellation of current accounts has been narrowing or expanding over time, using several convergence measures. Section 3 examines current account stationarity and persistence and the implications of increasing dispersion. Section 4 examines the role of economic openness in expanding the universe of current account balances. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains description of data, and two sections that are complementary to the paper's results.
Dispersion & Convergence
We first ask if the global constellation of current account imbalances has been expanding or narrowing over time. Conceptually, in the case of convergence, there is a universally unique end point-i.e., zero balance-around which all current accounts should converge (up to a discrepancy term). But predictions from economic theory are generally ambiguous on this or whether external balances should gravitate toward an alternative or, even, a degenerate distribution. The answer typically depends on the class of model-e.g., representative agent versus overlapping generations framework-and its assumptions regarding market completeness, initial conditions, and the history of shocks. Hence, whether current accounts actually converge or diverge and over what horizon are essentially empirical questions. To examine these issues more closely, we employ both non-parametric and parametric methods-including concepts from the growth literature on convergence-to determine if the universe of current accounts is expanding.
Unconditional Distributions
The unconditional distribution of current account ratios (in percent of GDP) at different points in time are shown in Figure 1 . Kernel density estimates of the cross-sectional distribution for 101 countries suggest that the universe of current accounts has been generally expanding. 4 As shown in the figure, the distribution of current accounts shows a steady increase in dispersion from 1960 to 2004, with the mass of the distribution being less concentrated in the area around zero and moving further out toward the tails. 5 The notable exception to this progressive pattern of expansion is the year 1980, when presumably the effects of oil shocks widened the dispersion of current accounts temporarily beyond that seen in later years. Notice too that the distributions for each year are not exactly centered around zero (but a small negative value), consistent with the global current account discrepancy. 6 4 The kernel estimator for an arbitrary point x i in the distribution is:
where X j is the jth data observation, N is the number of observations, h is the window size (i.e., the degree of smoothing), and K is the kernel or weighting function. The nonparametric estimates in Figure 1 are based on the Epanechnikov kernel; See Silverman (1986). Results using the less efficient Gaussian kernel (i.e., standard normal) are very similar. 8 Over the sample, the rate of increasing global dispersion is 1½ to 1¾ perent per year on an unweighted basis and 3¼ percent on a weighted basis. 
Another convergence perspective-commonly used in the growth literature-is the notion of "β-convergence." In the context of current accounts, β-convergence would require that countries accumulating past imbalances eventually unwind these positions. This would allow current accounts (and trade balances) globally to converge to more similar values around zero-i.e., the convergence point. 9 For example, countries with a large stock of net external debt, reflecting flow deficits in the past, would need to run current account surpluses in the future to pay down the debt or, at least, smaller current account deficits to decrease the share of debt relative to the overall economy. Comparing the initial net foreign asset ratio to the average current account ratio in subsequent years, however, provides very little support for 
Moreover, the slope of the line drawn is greater than typical estimates of nominal growth in GDP, suggesting these subsequent flow imbalances tend to augment the net stock of external assets or liabilities in relation to the size of the economy. Alternative coefficient estimates may be more comparable to nominal dollar growth rates. This would imply a reversion to the This result is comparable to the findings of Kraay and Ventura (2000) . Using the data from less than 20 industrial countries, they found that current account imbalances are proportional to the net external balance sheet positions. In response to an increase in savings, a creditor country tended to run surplus while a debtor country tended to stay in deficit. They view this to be the result of a portfolio choice in the presence of a large investment risk. While data 11 Dropping outlier countries with average current account imbalances (net external assets) greater than 10 percent (50 percent) of GDP in absolute terms would slightly lower the coefficient on initial NFA (to 0.06) but raise its significance level (p-value = 3%). limitation makes it difficult to examine the validity of their prediction for a wider set of countries, their model is one possible explanation for the result that we find for a very large set of countries.
To recap, the distributional and convergence properties of current account balances suggest an expanding universe. The β-convergence results further suggest that countries who have had current account imbalances historically are the group more likely to run subsequent current account imbalances (of the same sign) in ensuing periods, leading to further accumulation of net foreign assets or liabilities.
Stationarity & Persistence
We now examine aspects of the time-series properties of current accounts-in particular, stationarity and persistence. Trehan and Walsh (1991) showed that the stationarity of the current account is a sufficient condition for the intertemporal budget constraint to hold. 12 Stationarity has since been an indirect test of the basic premise of the intertemporal view of the current account. Thus, this type of behavior would indicate whether the expanding global dispersion of current accounts has also been compatible with respecting intertemporal budget constraints.
12 Trehan and Walsh showed that the stationarity of the current account was the necessary and sufficient condition, but the necessity was debated lately by Bohn (2006) .
To examine the stationarity and persistence properties of current accounts, a battery of unit root and stationarity tests were conducted. In particular, the well-known augmented DickeyFuller (ADF) test and non-parametric Phillips-Perron (PP) test for a unit root against a stationary alternative were applied to the individual country series for the current account ratio (in percent of GDP). In addition, the Kwiatowski et al (1992) (KPSS) test for stationarity against a unit root was also used. The corresponding test statistics and significance levels are shown in the appendix.
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Figure 4 summarizes the rejection and non-rejection rates (in percent) for these unit root tests. For more straightforward comparisons, the rejection of stationarity under the KPSS test is reported as a non-rejection of the unit root. Overall, the picture is quite mixed. One test finds the majority of current accounts to be non-stationary (ADF test), another tests finds the majority to be stationary (KPSS test), and the third test is split down the middle (PP test).
Individually, for nearly a quarter of the sample (22 of 101), these tests failed to reject both non-stationarity and stationarity for the same series (see appendix). This finding highlights two widely-known features of these tests and the time-series data: (1) unit root and stationarity tests tend to have low power (i.e., fail to reject too often) in finite samples, and (2) the current account is generally a very persistent series, making it difficult to distinguish between non-stationary and stationary alternatives over limited time spans. 
1/
For 21 countries-including, notably, the United States and Japan, the tests indicated (at least, statistically) a non-stationary current account ratio over this time span. That is, the unit root tests failed to reject non-stationarity and the KPSS test further rejected stationarity. But for more than half of the sample (55 of 101 countries), at least one of the two unit root tests reject and the stationarity test accept their respective null hypotheses, suggesting a stationary series.
Moreover, on the basis of panel unit root tests (Table 1) , non-stationarity is strongly rejected.
The tests were applied to three panels comprising different groups of countries according to data availability. 
Under either specification, there is significant AR(1) coefficient on the lagged current account, though with panel fixed effects, the degree of inertia is reduced somewhat.
But these specifications are, in a sense, incomplete-failing to recognize a common component associated with the particular pattern in the movement of global dispersion over the past several decades. Moreover, the β-convergence results indicate that countries with non-zero initial NFA positions continue to accumulate assets (liabilities) on a net basis by running current account surpluses (deficits) in subsequent periods. In other words, countries tend to run significant imbalances of the same sign (either positive or negative) as in the past.
To introduce this trend feature into the analysis, we include a sign-preserving time trend (sptrend) constructed as follows: 
The time trend specifies increasing surpluses or deficits depending on the sign of the current account in the previous period. Note too that this sign-preserving trend is also broadly consistent with preserving current account adding-up, while a simple time trend is not.
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Including this term into the panel fixed effects regression yields:
The trend capturing increasing dispersion is statistically significant (p value = 0.08). 16 The fit of the equation is marginally improved and the persistence parameter (AR1 coefficient) is smaller, as one would expect. 17 In other words, some of the observed persistence in external balances appears to reflect an underlying trend phenomenon-a slowly increasing global dispersion. This is perhaps better viewed as an evolving longer-run process occurring over many decades rather than the inertia in external balances seen from year to year.
Taking an average trend estimate over different specifications, one can examine the extent to which the recent increase in the U.S. current account deficit is due to this underlying global trend. Figure 5 shows the observed U.S. current account deficit ratio to GDP (line) and the long-run contributions (bars) that obtain from equation (4), reflecting the common or global trend term on average. Accounting for increasing global dispersion goes part way to explaining the burgeoning U.S. deficit in past years, but clearly the widening imbalance has gone far beyond these considerations. In level terms, the long-run component (adding the trend and either a common or country-specific constant) would narrow but not nearly close the "gap" with the observed deficit. 
Dispersion, Persistence, and Openness
We have seen that the cross section dispersion of current accounts has been rising while the time series of current accounts have remained stationary. In particular, equation (4) based on sign-preserving trends suggests that the cross-section distribution of long-run average current accounts (measured by the constant terms in AR(1) regression and the sign-preserving trends) has been spreading out. What are behind these trends? Are they in fact driven by the force of globalization, experienced as a rising integration of goods and financial markets across different countries?
We thus consider two economic variables that are likely to affect the behavior of external imbalances: openness to trade and financial flows. We measure trade openness by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, and financial openness by the Chinn-Ito index, scaled to lie between 0 and 1 (see the appendix for details). As most economies have been opening up and increasing external flows in trade and finance, a deterministic time trend will capture a large part of the common trend toward greater openness. Country-specific measures of openness, however, will help us to extract more information on the role of openness by exploiting different speeds toward openness among countries.
Countries with more open trade regimes would find it easier to sell goods produced beyond the need for domestic consumption and to import goods for which demand exceeds domestic production. The trade imbalance is the aggregate accumulation of such imbalances over the whole economy. A country with more open trade regime will thus be more likely to run a trade imbalance, and also find it easier to finance them given the wider base for international lending and borrowing.
More directly, countries with more open financial account will find it easier to lend or borrow to balance its savings capacity and investment need. In addition to enabling countries to put savings to the most productive use and to finance investment needs in the most efficient manner, a greater availability of investment and funding opportunities will tend to stimulate savings and investment, and increase international financial flows further.
To fix ideas on how to incorporate their effects on the dispersion of current accounts, let us consider the following AR(1) representation of the current account of country i. We separate these two channels in our estimation. To allow the cross-section distribution to spread out, we construct sign-preserving indicators of openness. When "tradeopen" and "finopen" measure openness in trade and financial accounts, respectively, sign-preserving openness indictors are:
This leads to an expanded version of equation (4). 
To incorporate the effects of openness on the persistence of current accounts, we also estimate a version that includes three additional interaction terms between the lagged current account and these three variables, Here, the sign of current accounts does not matter and In columns III and VI (in the lower panel), we introduce the openness measures as structural determinants that enable countries to run larger current account imbalances. The results indicate that the time trend must have reflected the effect of openness. In column III, the coefficient on time trend turns negative, while the coefficients on trade and financial openness are numerically large and statistically significant. In column VI, trade openness remains statistically significant while time trend and financial openness lose statistical significance. Between column III and column VI, using sample averages appears to have reduced a large part of variation in financial openness which has gone through particularly rapid changes since the late-1980s. In terms of their effect on persistence, the inclusion of openness measures further reduces the persistence parameter, again less strongly in column VI which uses the average measures of openness.
We examine the effects of these variables on the persistence parameter (AR1 coefficient). No strong prior applies to the direction of their effects. It is tempting to presume that a greater availability of financing will lead to a higher persistence of the shocks to current account, for countries will be able to finance their current account deficits more easily. However, the relaxation of financial constraints can also lead countries to fund their needs more quickly but at a larger scale. For example, a Solovian developing country that needs a large development financing will borrow a large amount in the beginning, if she can. Such response will imply a lower persistence of current account shocks and a larger dispersion of current account imbalances across countries. To summarize, a larger value of the persistence parameter is consistent with a more gradual financing, while a smaller value is consistent with a more rapid financing.
Starting with a regression that only uses time trend (column IV), the persistence parameter is found to have been declining over time. Countries are also found to have been able to run larger current account imbalances-deficit or surplus-over time. When we allow openness measures to affect persistence (columns V and VII), we uncover an interesting contrast in the effects of trade and financial openness. Trade openness, if any, increases the persistence of current account imbalance while financial openness reduces the persistence. And the effect of financial openness remains statistically significant even when the openness is measured by the average over the whole sample period. Most interesting is the joint effect of financial openness on persistence and the dispersion of long-run average current accounts. A financially more open-better integrated-country appears to be able to run a larger imbalance, but over a shorter duration. This is consistent with the possibility that financially better integrated countries can meet its international financing or investment need more quickly.
These findings are confirmed in Table 3 , where the same relationships as in Table 2 were estimated by popular GMM estimates, considering the presence of lagged dependent variables on the right hand side. Trade openness is found to increase the persistence of current account imbalances, whereas financial openness is found to clearly decrease the persistence of current account imbalances.
Concluding Remarks
Examining current accounts for a wide spectrum of countries over the past four and a half decades, we can summarize our key findings or "stylized facts" as follows:
• The universe of current accounts has been expanding over the past half century.
Based on a variety of measures and methodologies, the global constellation of external current account positions has markedly widened over time. While dispersion can vary significantly from year to year-ostensibly in response to large international shocks, there is a steady, underlying rate of expansion of around 2 to 3 percent per year.
• However, the underlying, long-run trend toward greater global dispersion suggests that inertia in current accounts from year to year may be overstated by simple estimates of persistence.
• Rising dispersion is also found to be closely associated with increasing financial integration of the world economy, among other things. At the same time, individual current account series and changes in net foreign assets (as ratios to GDP) are found to be stationary (albeit persistent), indicating that while dispersion is rising, basic intertemporal resource constraints are not likely violated for individual countries.
• Global imbalances though have run well ahead of underlying dispersion trends. The recent acceleration of external positions in major countries (including the United States) is clearly not fully accounted for by the trend behavior exhibited by the universal expansion.
From an economic standpoint, the results lend support to recent views that some, though not all, of the large global current account imbalances are due to the ongoing integration of the world economy. In particular, it is not surprising that we would see, in an increasingly integrated global economy, higher levels of current account deficits (including in the United States) and surpluses in key partner countries. The other side of this trend is the likely weakening in the statistical hold of the Feldstein-Horioka results. However, we also find that the underlying pace of the increase in global dispersion is not as fast as sometimes claimed -25 -and has bounds, indicating that a sizable part of today's global imbalances is likely in excess (relative to the underlying trend) and would probably be unwound to a significant degree.
Some movements in that direction appear to have finally started in the United States, while the counterpart movements are less evenly distributed.
Appendix I. Data Description
The main variable is the ratio of the current account to the GDP, both of which were obtained from various issues of International Financial Statistics (IMF) and World Development Indicator (World Bank). The capital account liberalization index was developed by Chinn and Ito (2005), and is the first principal component of several variables that reflect the ease of cross-border financial transactions. In our estimation, the index was normalized to take a value between 0 and 1, increasing with the liberalization of capital account regime. For each value of Chinn-Ito index it CI , our indicator is defined as follows.
Descriptive statistics for the ratio of the current account to GDP show:
• Unconditional means in more than three-quarters (74 out of 94) of the countries statistically different from zero (p=0.05 or higher); see Table A0 .
• Conditional means in more than half of the countries (64 out of 94), based country constants (i.e., fixed effects), are significantly different from 0 (p= 0.10 or higher).
• For higher moments, evidence of skewness or excess kurtosis ("fat tails") was found in 28 out of 94 countries (i.e., 30 percent of sample).
Appendix II. Alternative Measures of External Positions and Their Behavior
A related but distinct measure is the change in net foreign assets (NFA). It essentially differs from the current account by the amount of capital gains (valuation change), which is driven by asset price fluctuations, including exchange rate variations. Since these asset price movements are broadly described as a random walk, the change in NFA will contain a much larger white-noise component and exhibit smaller persistence than the current account. This is indeed confirmed by the data, as summarized in the following two charts. Note that due to data limitations regarding NFA, the sample size is smaller.
First, the change in NFA (in percent of GDP) is subjected to the same battery of stationarity and unit root tests as for the current account, summarized in Figure 4 . The test results uniformly show a higher rejection rate of non-stationarity. See Figure A1 . Second, for the change in the ratio of NFA to GDP-i.e., ∆(NFA/y)-the indications toward stationarity are even stronger; see Figure A2 . Changes in the ratio also include a growth term (related to the change in the scaling variable GDP). This helps toward finding stationarity in the ratio given that GDP (i.e., the denominator) is growing over time. Excluding the growth factor term (by considering ∆NFA/y) weakens the stationarity finding, but does not overturn it. That is, the ∆NFA concept appears to be much more stationary (less persistent) series than CA. 
Appendix III. Expanding Dispersion and Financial Market Integration
Considering the pivotal role of the financial openness in expanding the global dispersion of current accounts, we present an illustrative (steady-sate) model where the ongoing integration in international financial markets increases the global dispersion of current accounts. Some form of heterogeneity is the necessary condition for global dispersion, and we introduce the heterogeneity in the discount rate. Combined with a small cost of financial intermediation, which represents financial market friction, we generate a non-degenerate steady-state distribution of net foreign assets. Further introducing growth in aggregate output, we show The first condition for each country's consumption-saving choice is:
In the steady state, 1 it it i c c c + = = , and equation (7) In a no-growth economy just described, the steady-state current account remains in zero balance and there is no dispersion in current accounts. Introducing economic growth leads to a steady-state dispersion in current accounts. Now assume that each country's population grows at the same rate g . The aggregate output of a country at time t becomes:
, normalizing the time-0 population at unity. Denoting the aggregate net foreign assets by a capitalized letter, it A , the change in the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP can be rewritten in terms of the current account as follows.
( )
In the steady state with the constant ratio of the aggregate net foreign assets to GDP, 1 1 1
A tighter integration of international financial markets is represented as a decline in γ , which lowers the cost of international financial transactions. This will increase the dispersion in the ratio of current account to GDP. An asterisk * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 5 (1) percent level.
